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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The problem of identifying an auction design that maximizes the auctioneers expected revenue
(optimal auction) is in general diﬃcult (see for example Ronen and Saberi (2002)). An obvious
diﬃculty is the fact that there are a multiplicity of parameters to play with. For example, should
payment depend on the bidders identity? Should one employ a reserve price? Should one subsidize
some bidders? Does it pay to screen bidders before hand? There are a multitude of design param-
eters to set. It is not clear how one searches through all these parameters to ﬁnd the setting that
best achieves them.
Under the assumption of independent private values, the revelation principle of Myerson (1981)
allows one, without loss of generality, to restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms. When
the types of agents were continuous and one-dimensional Myerson used the revelation principle to
determine the optimal auction. Myerson’s (1981) approach has become a staple in the auction
design literature. However, the approach cannot be easily extended to deal with multi-dimensional
types (see the review by Rochet and Stole (2003)).
Most eﬀorts for solving the optimal auction problem with multi-dimensional types have assumed
a continuous type space. In this paper we study auctions with multi-dimensional types that are
discrete. This has the advantage of transparency of analysis, and it also allows us to approach the
problem from an intuitive network perspective. We interpret optimal auction payments as being
determined by shortest paths on a network representing bidders types. This approach highlights
the connections between optimal mechanism design and the problem of ﬁnding a shortest path in
a lattice, as well as linear programming. It clariﬁes the nature of the diﬃculties inherent in the
multi-dimensional optimal auction design problem, and makes clear which cases are solvable and
which are not.
This paper oﬀers a comparison between the optimal auction problem with continuous types and
with discrete types. We will examine the optimal auction problem in one and multi-dimensional
settings, providing a network interpretation of existing results, such as Myerson’s (1981) one-
dimensional optimal auction design problem, and Wilson’s (1993) problem of a monopolist facing
consumers with two-dimensional types. Our approach also provides a new result for a particular
case when types are two-dimensional.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a general setup and describes a
motivating example. Section 3 is devoted to the case of one-dimensional types and its connection
to Myerson (1981). In this section we give a new perspective on the ironing procedure. A general
2analysis of multi-dimensional optimal auctions is provided in Section 4. Analyses of particular
solvable cases are performed in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Setup and Motivating Example
F o l l o w i n gM y s e r s o nw ei n v o k et h er e v e l a t i o np r i n ciple. The model and notation used are described
below.
1. Agents and auctioneer are risk neutral.
2. F is the set of feasible allocations of the resources amongst the agents and the auctioneer.
3. T = {t1,t 2,...,t m} is a ﬁnite set of an agent’s types (possibly multi-dimensional). A collection
of types one for each (of n agents) will be called a proﬁle t.L e tTn be the set of all proﬁles.
Ap r o ﬁle involving only n − 1 agents will be denoted tn−1.
4. If a ∈ F and a bidder has type ti she assigns monetary value v(a|ti) to the allocation a ∈ F.
5. Uncertainty about how the valuations of the bidders is captured assuming that types are
independent draws from a common distribution that is commonly known. This is the common
prior assumption. Let fi be the probability that a bidder has type ti.
6. The probability of a proﬁle tn−1 ∈ Tn−1 being realized is π(tn−1).
One could easily include costs for the seller into the setup, but it changes nothing essential
in the arguments and clutters the notation. In a departure from the auction theory literature we
assume a discrete type space.
By the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms. Each
agent is asked to announce her type. The auctioneer, as a function of the announcements, decides
what element of F to pick and what payments each agent will make.
Let Pi be the expected payment that an agent who announces type ti must make. An allocation
rule assigns to each member of Tn an element of F.1 If a is an allocation rule, write ai(t)t od e n o t e
the the allocation to a type ti under proﬁle t. The expected utility of an agent with type ti under
1Strictly speaking one should allow an allocation rule to be randomized. Given risk neutrality, we omit this
possibility. To account for it requires introducing additional notation that is subsequently not used.










To ensure that an agent will report truthfully we impose (Bayesian) incentive compatibility
(IC): for each agent with type ti:
Etn−1[v(ai[ti,t n−1]|ti)] − Pi ≥ Etn−1[v(aj[tj,t n−1]|ti)] − Pj ∀ti,t j ∈ T.
To ensure that each agent has the incentive to participate we impose the individual rationality
(IR) constraint:
Etn−1[v(ai[ti,t n−1]|ti)] − Pi ≥ 0 ∀ti ∈ T.
If we add a dummy type, t0 which assigns utility 0 to all allocations, and set P0 =0 ,w ec a nf o l d
the IR constraint into the IC constraint.2 So, from now on T contains the dummy type t0.
The auctioneer’s problem is to maximize expected revenue subject to IC. Expected revenue
(normalized for population) is
Pm






s.t. Etn−1[v(ai[ti,t n−1]|ti)] − Pi ≥ Etn−1[v(aj[tj,t n−1]|ti)] − Pj ∀ti,t j ∈ T.
Call this program LPa.I f LPa is infeasible set R(a)=−∞. Thus the auctioneers problem is to
ﬁnd the allocation rule a that maximizes R(a).
One way to solve this optimization problem is to ﬁx the allocation rule a.T h e nw ec a nr e w r i t e
the IC constraint as follows:
Pi − Pj ≤ Etn−1[v(ai[ti,t n−1]|ti)] − Etn−1[v(aj[tj,t n−1]|ti)] ∀i 6= j.
If there is a feasible solution to this system of inequalities then we can ﬁnd payments that implement
a in an incentive compatible way.
2It is sometimes common to require that the actual payoﬀ be non-negative rather than the expected payoﬀ as we
have done here. This stronger condition is called ex-post individual rationality.
4To understand this inequality system it helps to ﬂip to its dual. The dual is a network ﬂow
problem that can be described in the following way. Introduce one node for each type (the node
corresponding to the dummy type will be the source) and to each directed edge (j,i), assign a length
of Etn−1[v(ai[ti,t n−1]|ti)]−Etn−1[v(aj[tj,t n−1]|ti)]. Each Pi corresponds to the length of the shortest
path from the source to vertex i.F o rﬁxed a, the optimization problem reduces to determining the
shortest path tree in this network (union of all shortest paths from source to all nodes).3
2.1 Motivating Example
Consider the allocation of one good among two agents with types {0,1,2}, here 0 is the dummy
type. Let f1 = f2 =1 /2a n dπ(1) = π(2) = 1/2 be the probabilities. Choose as the allocation
rule the following: assign the object to the agent with highest type, in case of ties randomize the
allocation ‘50-50’. The possible allocations are: agent 1 wins, agent 2 wins, agent 1 and 2 get 1/2o f
the item, seller keeps it. For the valuations we have: an agent of type ti who wins the item values
it at ti; if he tied with his competitor and gets only a half he derives value ti/2i fﬁnally he loses
or the seller keeps it, he gets value 0. Now to the computation of expected utility when honest. If








and is equal to 3
2 if ti =2 .
Similarly we obtain for Etn−1[v(α[t,tn−1]|ti):














s.t. P1 − P0 ≤ 1
4,P 0 − P1 ≤ 0,P 0 − P2 ≤ 0,
P2 − P0 ≤ 3
2,P 2 − P1 ≤ 1,P 1 − P2 ≤− 1
2,
P0 =0 .
3The reader unfamiliar with Network Flows may consult Ahuja, Maganati and Orlin (1993).
5The resulting shortest path problem is depicted dashed in ﬁgure 1. Reading oﬀ the shortest
path distances to t1,t 2 yields P1 =1 /4a n dP2 =5 /4. So the auctioneer can realize revenue of 3/4











































If the network has a negative cycle, the dual problem is unbounded, which means the original
primal problem is infeasible. Thus, there is no set of payments to make the allocation a incentive
compatible. To summarize, given an allocation rule we have a way of checking whether it can be
implemented in an incentive compatible way.
Naively, one could ﬁxa na l l o c a t i o nr u l ea, then solve the inequality system and repeat. The
problem is that the set of allocation rules need not be ﬁnite or even countable! Thus, unless one is
prepared to make additional assumptions about the structure of the problem, the optimal auction
will be diﬃcult to identify. The rest of the paper is dedicated to solving the optimal auction
problem in one and multi-dimensional settings from the point of view that auction payments are
determined by shortest paths through a network representing agents’ types.
3 The One Good (Multi-Unit) Case
We consider ﬁrst the case of a seller with K units of an indivisible good who is selling it to n buyers
with constant marginal valuations. The marginal valuations are private information.4
If a is an allocation rule, write Ai to be the (expected) quantity of the good that an agent with
type ti receives. The approach taken is to identify inequalities that the Ai’s must satisfy. This
will yield a relaxation of the underlying optimization problem with the Ai’s as decision variables.
Subsequently we identify an allocation rule that will generate the expected allocations identiﬁed in
the solution to the relaxation.
4This case is dicussed in Rochet and Stole (2003).
6IC implies:
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Aj|i) − Pj.
We associate a network with this collection of IC constraints. Introduce a vertex i for each type
i. Between every ordered pair of vertices (j,i) a directed edge of length v(Ai|i) − v(Aj|i). The
allocation rule will be incentive compatible iﬀ. this network has no negative length cycle. if this
network has no negative length cycles we can choose the Pi’s to be the length of the path from an
arbitrarily chosen root vertex, r,t ov e r t e xi in the shortest path tree rooted at r. If in addition we
want the IR constraint to hold, we would choose the root, r to be the vertex corresponding to the
dummy type t0.
Assuming a is incentive compatible, the cycle i → j → i must have non-negative length. This
observation gives us our ﬁrst result.
Theorem 1 An allocation rule that is incentive compatible must be monotonic. That is if r ≤ s
then Ar ≤ As.
Proof. Suppose r ≤ s but Ar > As. Then, incentive compatibility implies that
v(Ar|r) − v(As|r) ≥ Pr − Ps.
Increasing diﬀerences implies that
v(Ar|r) − v(As|r) ≤ v(Ar|s) − v(As|s).
Hence
v(Ar|s) − v(As|s) ≥ Pr − Ps,
i.e. v(Ar|s) − Pr ≥ v(As|s) − Ps, violating incentive compatibility.
If i ≥ j we refer to
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Aj|i) − Pj
as a downward IC constraint. If i<jit is called an upward IC constraint. Next we show that
‘adjacent’ IC constraints suﬃce. This also follows from the absence of negative cycles. If the
network has no negative length cycles, then the length of the edge from i to i + 2 must be at least
as large as the length of (i,i + 1) plus the length of (i +1 ,i+2 ) .
7Theorem 2 Suppose that v satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences. All IC constraints are implied by the
following:
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai−1|i) − Pi−1 ∀i =1 ,...,m (ICd
i)
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai+1|i) − Pi+1 ∀i =1 ,...,m− 1( I C u
i )
Proof. To show why only the adjacent downward IC constraints are suﬃcient, we show that the
following pair of inequalities:
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai−1|i) − Pi−1
v(Ai−1|i − 1) − Pi−1 ≥ v(Ai−2|i − 1) − Pi−2
imply v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai−2|i) − Pi−2. The rest will follow by induction.
Adding the given pair of inequalities yields:
v(Ai|i) − Pi + v(Ai−1|i − 1) ≥ v(Ai−1|i)+v(Ai−2|i − 1) − Pi−2.
Rearranging this:
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ [v(Ai−1|i) − v(Ai−2|i)] − [v(Ai−1|i − 1) − v(Ai−2|i − 1)] + v(Ai−2|i) − Pi−2.
By increasing diﬀerences and monotonicity of the allocation rule:
[v(Ai−1|i) − v(Ai−2|i)] − [v(Ai−1|i − 1) − v(Ai−2|i − 1)] ≥ 0,
and this yields
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai−2|i) − Pi−2.
Almost identical argument show that only the adjacent upward IC constraints are suﬃcient.
This follows from the fact that the following pair of inequalities:
v(Ai+1|i) − v(Ai|i) ≤ Pi+1 − Pi
v(Ai+2|i +1 )− v(Ai+1|i +1 )≤ Pi+2 − Pi+1
when added together imply that
v(Ai+2|i) − v(Ai|i)+[ v(Ai+2|i +1 )− v(Ai+1|i +1 ) ]− [v(Ai+2|i) − v(Ai+1|i)] ≤ Pi+2 − Pi,
and hence by increasing diﬀerences and monotonicity of the allocation rule:
v(Ai+2|i) − v(Ai|i) ≤ Pi+2 − Pi
8The rest follows by induction.
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Notice that this network has no negative length cycles if and only if all the cycles on adjacent
pairs of vertices are non-negative. Speciﬁcally,
v(Ai|i) − v(Ai−1|i)+v(Ai−1|i − 1) − v(Ai|i − 1) ≥ 0
implies that
v(Ai|i) − v(Aj|i) ≥ v(Ai|i − 1) − v(Ai−1|i − 1).
By increasing diﬀerences, this last inequality can hold only if Ai ≥ Ai−1.T h a ti s ,t h ea l l o c a t i o nr u l e
must be monotonic. We thus conclude that a is incentive compatible if and only if a is monotonic.
Suppose now that a is incentive compatible. We know that the our network of ﬁgure 2 has no
negative length cycles. It is easy to see that the shortest path tree rooted at dummy vertex ‘0’





[v(Ar|r) − v(Ar−1|r)]. (1)
Notice that Pi − Pi−1 = v(Ai|i) − v(Ai−1|i) for the above expected payment schedule, hence all
downward IC constraints are satisﬁed and bind, i.e.
v(Ai|i) − Pi = v(Ai−1|i) − Pi−1 ∀i =1 ,...,m.
It is easy to see that the upward IC constraints all hold, but for completeness we provide the
argument.
Lemma 1 If either the downward constraint (ICd
i) or the upward constraint (ICu
i−1) binds, then
the other one is satisﬁed.
9Proof. If the downward adjacent ICd
i constraint binds, then
v(Ai|i) − v(Ai−1|i)=Pi − Pi−1.
Then by increasing diﬀerences and monotonicity of the allocation rule:
v(Ai|i − 1) − v(Ai−1|i − 1) ≤ Pi − Pi−1,
which means that the corresponding upward constraint ICu
i−1 is satisﬁed.
If the upward adjacent ICu
i−1 constraint binds, then
v(Ai|i − 1) − v(Ai−1|i − 1) = Pi − Pi−1.
Then by increasing diﬀerences and monotonicity of the allocation rule:
v(Ai|i) − v(Ai−1|i) ≥ Pi − Pi−1,
which means that the corresponding downward constraint ICd
i is satisﬁed.
We now summarize our conclusions.
Theorem 3 For any monotonic allocation rule a there exists an expected payment schedule {Pi}m
i=0,
such that all the adjacent IC constraints are satisﬁed.





Notice that Pi − Pi−1 = v(Ai|i) − v(Ai−1|i) for the above expected payment schedule {Pi}m
i=0,
hence all (ICd)a r es a t i s ﬁed and bind, i.e.
v(Ai|i) − Pi = v(Ai−1|i) − Pi−1 ∀i =1 ,...,m.
Hence Lemma 1 gives us that all (ICu)a r es a t i s ﬁed, and thus by Theorem 2 the allocation rule a
is incentive compatible.
3.1 A Formulation





10Let ni(t) be the number of agents with type ti. The problem of ﬁnding the optimal auction can be
formulated as:





s.t. v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai−1|i) − Pi−1 ∀i =1 ,...,m (ICd
i)
v(Ai|i) − Pi ≥ v(Ai+1|i) − Pi+1 ∀i =1 ,...,m− 1( I C u
i )




ai[ti,t n−1]π(tn−1)( A )
X
i
ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn (C)
An upper bound on each Pi is the length of the shortest path from the dummy node ‘0’ to
vertex i in the network of ﬁgure 2. This is proved formally below.
Lemma 2 All downward constraints (ICd
i) bind in a solution to the [OPT1] problem.
Proof. First, notice that at an optimal solution of the [OPT1] problem either (ICd
i)o r( I C u
i−1)
must bind for ∀i, since otherwise we can either increase payments, or reduce allocations, thus
achieving more revenue. If (ICd
i)b i n d s ,i tg i v e s
Pd
i = v(Ai|i) − v(Ai−1|i)+Pi−1. (Pd)
Binding (ICu
i−1)g i v e s
Pu
i = v(Ai|i − 1) − v(Ai−1|i − 1) + Pi−1. (Pu)
then increasing diﬀerences and monotonicity of the allocation rule imply Pd
i ≥ Pu
i , i.e. that higher
revenue is achieved with (ICd
i) constraints binding.
The essence of the previous result is that once the allocation rule is chosen, equation (1) pins
down the payments necessary to ensure incentive compatibility. Our problem reduces to ﬁnding
the optimal allocation rule.




r=1[v(Ar|r) − v(Ar−1|r)]. Write F(i)=
Pi
r=1 fr then




n{fiv(Ai|i)+( 1− F(i))[v(Ai|i) − v(Ai|i +1 ) ] }.





[v(Ai|i +1 )− v(Ai|i)].
The function µ is what Myerson calls the virtual valuation.
Problem [OPT1] becomes












ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn
3.2 The Myerson Case
Myerson (1981) makes the following additional assumptions:
1. v(q|i)=iq,a n d
2.
1−F(i)
fi is non-decreasing in i.







.T h e n

















ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn

















a1[t1,t n−1]π(tn−1) ≤ ...≤
X
tn−1∈Tn−1
am[tm,t n−1]π(tn−1) ≤ K
X
i
ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn
12If we ignore the monotonicity constraints, this problem can be decomposed into |Tn| subproblems






















ni(t) } and set ar(t)=K/nr(t). The monotone hazard condition
ensures that the largest index is always chosen. Thus the solution to the program is monotonic, i.e.
ai+1(t) ≥ ai(t)f o ra l li and proﬁles t. It follows from this that the ignored monotonicity constraints
on expected allocations are satisﬁed.
The above analysis naturally yields the revenue equivalence result of auction theory.
Theorem 4 All incentive compatible allocation rules that result in the same equilibrium expected
allocation schedule {Ai}m
i=0 generate the same expected revenue for the seller.
Proof. Recall that the expected payment Pi is determined through the length of the shortest





Notice that the length of the shortest path and hence the expected payment is uniquely deﬁned by
the equilibrium expected allocations {Ai}m
i=0. Therefore we conclude that all incentive compatible
allocation rules that result in the same equilibrium expected allocation schedule {Ai}m
i=0 generate
the same expected payments {Pi}m
i=1, and hence the same expected revenue for the seller.
The monotonicity constraints are useful because they allow us to restrict the space of possible
allocation rules. However, their presence prevents us from decomposing the optimization problem
into separate problems over proﬁles. The hazard rate condition is one suﬃcient condition for such
a decomposition to be possible.
3.3 Ironing
Here we discuss how to solve problem when the monotone hazard condition does not hold. Recall
that our problem is



















ai+1[ti+1,t n−1]π(tn−1) ≤ 0 ∀ i =0 ,...,m− 1
X
i
ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn
Here we interpret a0[t0,t n−1] to be zero for all tn−1.






ai+1[ti+1,t n−1]π(tn−1) ≤ 0 ∀ i =0 ,...,m− 1.































ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn
























ni(t)ai[ti,t n−1] ≤ K ∀t ∈ Tn









































t∈Tn g(t,λ)π(t). Now Z =m i n λ≥0 Z(λ). We can formulate minλ≥0 Z(λ)a sa


















∀t ∈ Tn ,∀ni(t) > 0
Wt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ Tn
λi ≥ 0 i =1 ,...,m
λm =0












as type i’s ironed virtual valuation.
Theorem 5 There exists an optimal solution to (IP) where the ironed virtual valuations are mono-
tonic.
Proof. Call the support of a proﬁle t the set of i ∈ {1,...,m} such that ni(t) > 0. If two proﬁles
t and t0 have the same support then it is easy to see that that there is an optimal solution to (IP)
such that Wt = Wt0. This observation allows us to reformulate (IP) using diﬀerent variables. For
















∀S, ∀i ∈ S (2)
H(S) ≥ 0 ∀S











fi for all i where λ∗ is an optimal solution to the (IP0)p r o b l e m
above.
Suppose for a contradiction that there is no optimal solution λ∗ to (IP0)w h e r e{h∗
i}m
i=0 are





Amongst all optimal solutions to (IP0) pick the one that has the smallest discrepancy. If the
discrepancy is zero, we are done. So, suppose not. Therefore there exits at least one j, such that
h∗
j−1 >h ∗
j. If there exist more than one j such that h∗
j−1 >h ∗




15First, consider the case when there exists at least one l ≥ j,s u c ht h a th∗
j <h ∗
l+1.I ft h e r ee x i s t
more than one such l, choose the smallest l,f o rw h i c hh∗
j <h ∗
l+1.5








i − ε ∀i ∈ [j,l],
λ0
i = λ∗


































i ∀i 6∈ {j − 1,j,l+1 }.
Denote the change in the (IP0) problem objective function from changing λ∗ to λ0 by ∆Z.
Consider the sets S,f o rw h i c hH(S)a r ea ﬀected by this change (recall that H(S)r e ﬂects the
highest value of the right hand side in (2)).
For ε>0s u ﬃciently small, decreasing h∗
j−1 by ε
fj−1 aﬀects H(S)o n l yi fj−1 ∈ S and h∗
k <h ∗
j−1
for all k ∈ S\{j−1}. Similarly the decrease of h∗
l+1 by ε
fl+1 aﬀects H(S)i fl+1∈ S and h∗
k <h ∗
l+1
for all k ∈ S \{ l +1 }. So the corresponding aﬀected sets S are of the form:
{j − 1 ∈ S and h∗
k <h ∗
j−1 for all k ∈ S \{ j − 1}},
{l +1 ∈ S and h∗
k <h ∗
l+1 for all k ∈ S \{ l +1 }}.
For ε>0s u ﬃciently small, increasing h∗
j by 2 ε
fj aﬀects H(S)o n l yi fj ∈ S and hk ≤ hj for all
k ∈ S \{ j}. So the sets S aﬀected by the upward change in h∗
j are of the form:
{j ∈ S and h∗
k ≤ h∗
j for all k ∈ S \{ j}}.
Let
P∗
j =P r ( S : j ∈ S, h∗
k ≤ h∗
j ∀k ∈ S \{ j}),
P∗
j−1 =P r ( S : j − 1 ∈ S, h∗
k <h ∗
j−1 ∀k ∈ S \{ j − 1}),
P∗
l+1 =P r ( S : l +1∈ S, h∗
k <h ∗
l+1 ∀k ∈ S \{ l +1 }}).
5It is possible that l = j.
16Then
P∗





















l+1)=P r ( n − 1d r a w sf r o m{1,...,m} and all have h∗
k <h ∗
l+1).
















Hence ∆Z ≤ 0, and we conclude that λ0 is also an optimal solution to (IP0). Computing the
change in discrepancy from λ∗ to λ0 we observe that max{hj−2 − hj−1,0} can increase by at most
ε/fj−1, the term max{hj−1 − hj,0} goes down by ε/fj−1 +2 ε/fj,t h et e r mm a x {hj − hj+1,0}
goes up by 2ε/fj, and the term term max{hl − hl+1,0} goes down by ε/fl+1. The contribution
to discrepancy from other terms is unchanged.6 Notice that the discrepancy changes by ε/fj−1 −
(ε/fj−1 +2 ε/fj)+2 ε/fj − ε/fl+1 < 0, contradicting our choice of λ∗ as the one with the smallest
discrepancy.
Now consider the case when there is no l ≥ j, such that h∗
j <h ∗
l+1.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t h∗
j =
h∗
j+1 = ... = h∗
m.7





i + ε ∀i ∈ [j − 1,m− 1],
λ0
i = λ∗
i ∀i 6∈ [j − 1,m− 1].
6Notice that in the case when l = j,t h et e r mm a x {hj − hj+1,0} is also unchanged for a small enough ε>0.




























i ∀i 6∈ {j − 1,m}.
Denote the change in the (IP0) problem objective function from changing λ∗ to λ0 by ∆Z.
Consider the sets S for which H(S)a r ea ﬀected by this change (recall that H(S)r e ﬂects the
highest value of the right hand side in (2)).
For ε>0s u ﬃciently small, decreasing h∗
j−1 by ε
fj−1 aﬀects H(S)o n l yi fj−1 ∈ S and h∗
k <h ∗
j−1
for all k ∈ S \{ j − 1}. So the sets S aﬀected by the downward change in h∗
j−1 are of the form:
{j − 1 ∈ S and h∗
k <h ∗
j−1 for all k ∈ S \{ j − 1}}.
For ε>0s u ﬃciently small, increasing h∗
m by ε
fm aﬀects H(S)o n l yi fm ∈ S and h∗
k ≤ h∗
m for
all k ∈ S \{ m}.S ot h es e t sS aﬀected by the upward change in h∗
m are of the form:
{m ∈ S and h∗
k ≤ h∗
m for all k ∈ S \{ m}}.
Let
P∗
j−1 =P r ( S : j − 1 ∈ S, h∗
k <h ∗
j−1 ∀k ∈ S \{ j − 1}),
P∗
m =P r ( S : m ∈ S, h∗
k ≤ h∗
m ∀k ∈ S \{ m}).
Then
P∗




























This contradicts the optimality of λ∗ if ∆Z<0, or implies that λ0 is also an optimal solution
to (IP0)i f∆Z = 0. In the latter case, we compute the change in discrepancy from λ∗ to λ0.N o t i c e
that max{hj−2 − hj−1,0} c a ni n c r e a s eb ya tm o s tε/fj−1, and the term max{hj−1 − hj,0} goes
down by ε/fj−1 + ε/fj. The contribution to discrepancy from other terms is unchanged. Hence
the discrepancy changes by ε/fj−1 − (ε/fj−1 + ε/fj)=−ε/fj < 0, contradicting our choice of λ∗
as the optimal solution with the smallest discrepancy.
As we see, both possibilities for a choice of an optimal solution λ∗ the (IP0) problem with the
smallest positive discrepancy lead to contradictions with the optimality of λ∗. Therefore, there
exists an optimal solution to (IP) with the monotonic ironed virtual valuations {h∗
i}m
i=0.
We can now repeat the analysis of Section 3.2 with the virtual valuations replaced by the ironed
virtual valuations.
3.4 Comparison with Continuous Approach
Consider Myerson’s (1981) approach in the case of a seller with K units of a divisible good who
is selling it to n buyers with independent private valuations v(q|i)=iq, where buyers’ types i are
distributed on a continuous interval [i,¯ ı] according to the pdf function f(i). The central idea of
Myerson’s (1981) approach is the use of the indirect buyers utility function U(i)=iAi − Pi.W e
can then rewrite IC constraints using the indirect utility function as
U(i) ≥ iAi0 − Pi0 ∀i,i0, (3)
U(i0) ≥ i0Ai − Pi ∀i,i0. (4)
Combining (3) and (4) gives
(i − i0)Ai0 ≤ U(i) − U(i0) ≤ (i − i0)Ai, (5)
which implies that Ai and U(i) are non-decreasing. The monotonicity of Ai implies that it is a.e.
continuous. Thus, rewriting (5) as
Ai0 ≤
U(i) − U(i0)
i − i0 ≤ Ai,
19and taking limits as i0 → i at points where Ai is continuous, we conclude that U0(i)=Ai a.e.,






Pi = iAi −
Z i
i
Avdv − U(i). (6)
The expression (6) is a continuous analog of the discrete expression (1), and can be interpreted
as if the payment Pi was set by following a continuous path from the outside option, that is given
by the indirect utility for the lowest type i,t ot y p ei through a continuous set (or graph) [i,¯ ı].
It is important to observe that this path represents the shortest path consistent with binding IC
constraints along the way (in the continuous case, we can interpret that IC constraints for a buyer
of type i do bind in an inﬁnitesimal neighborhood of i). Fortunately, there is only one possible
d i r e c t i o nf o rt h es h o r t e s tp a t hb e t w e e nt h el o w e s tp o s s i b l et y p e ,a n dt y p ei in one dimension, i.e.
the path that goes through all intermediate types between the lowest possible type, and type i,
and there is absolutely no conceptual diﬀerence between continuous and discrete approaches. In
the multi-dimensional case there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the continuous and discrete
approaches.
Ironing in the model of discrete types is conceptually similar, but computationally easier than
in the continuous type model. The continuous type case requires the solution of a Hamiltonian
problem, in the discrete case a linear program.
4M u l t i - D i m e n s i o n a l T y p e s
4.1 Continuous Approach Overview
Consider the case when buyers have multi-dimensional types i = {i1,...,i D}, which are distributed
on Ω, a convex compact subset of RD
+, with a density function f(t) being continuous on Ω with
supp(f)=Ω. Buyers’ private valuations given by v(a|i)=i · a =
PD
j=1 ijaj, where allocations
a = {a1,...,aD} belong to RD. Denoting the expected allocations and payment for the buyer of
type i in a direct mechanism as Ai = {A1,...,AD} and Pi respectively, we can write down the
indirect utility function as U(i)=i ·A i − Pi. As with one-dimensional types, we can rewrite the
20IC constraints using the indirect utility function as
U(i) ≥ iAi0 − Pi0 ∀i,i0, (7)
U(i0) ≥ i0Ai − Pi ∀i,i0. (8)
Combining (7) and (8) gives
(i − i0)Ai0 ≤ U(i) − U(i0) ≤ (i − i0)Ai,
Ai0 ≤
U(i) − U(i0)
i − i0 ≤ Ai. (9)
If U(i)w e r ed i ﬀerentiable a.e., then taking limits in (9) as ∆(i0 − i)d → 0i ne a c hd i m e n s i o nd,





Pi = iAi −
Z
l
Avdv − U(i). (11)
for any path l in Ω connecting any two types i and i. Hence the choice of the path to type i
through Ω in order to determine the payment Pi does not matter if in the case of multi-dimensional
continuous types, if the indirect utility function U(i)i sd i ﬀerentiable.
Notice that we do not need diﬀerentiability of U(i) to obtain partial derivatives a.e.,a n dt o
form the gradient. Indeed, taking limits in (9) as (i0 −i)d → 0i ne a c hd i m e n s i o nd, yields ∇U(i)=
Ai. Unfortunately, even the existence of partial derivatives, does not guarantee diﬀerentiability
of U(i) in the multi-dimensional case,8 hence the expression (11) can not be viewed as a multi-
dimensional analog of (6). A general representation of rationalizable preferences in terms of the
indirect utility function was provided by Rochet (1987), and reformulated in terms of incentive-
compatible allocations for the study of optimal mechanisms in Rochet and Chon´ e (1998) as follows:
There exist expected allocation and price schedules such that the IC constrains are satisﬁed for
a.e. i if and only if
1. Ai = ∇U(i) for a.e. i in Ω,
2. U is convex and continuous on Ω.
Notice that Ai = ∇U(i)d o e sn o ti m p l yd i ﬀerentiability of U(i), hence the only analog for
expression (10) is
Pi = i · ∇U(i) − U(i). (12)
8See Example 1 in Krishna and Perry (2000) for a nondiﬀerentiable indirect utility function.
21The closest analog to the expression (6) in the multi-dimension context is given in Krishna
and Perry (2000) as a payoﬀ equivalence result that states that an IC mechanism’s indirect utility




Ari+(1−r)i(i − i)dr. (13)
The above expression gives
Pi = iAi −
Z 1
0
Ari+(1−r)i(i − i)dr − U(i). (14)
The expression (14) is a multi-dimensional analog of the discrete expression (6), and can be
interpreted as if the payment Pi was set by following a straight path from a type i,w h e r eI R
constraint binds to type i through Ω. Unfortunately, there is no direct analog to the above approach
in the discrete multi-dimensional case. The reason for that lies in the fact that although the payment
Pi for a particular allocation scheme is given by the shortest path9 towards the vertex i, there is no
analog to the gradient of the indirect utility function in the multi-dimensional discrete case. Indeed,
the incremental indirect utility ∆U(i)a tt h ev e r t e xi is determined by the edge (i0,i) originating
in one of adjacent vertices i0, along which the IC constraint binds. This binding IC constraint also
gives the direction of the increase in the indirect utility, but this direction can not be averaged out
to form an average direction of the indirect utility increase (i.e. the indirect utility gradient) due
to the discrete nature of this direction.
This logic shows that the indirect utility approach does not work in the discrete multi-dimensional
case, and that we have to rely on an enumeration of all the binding IC constraints and the cor-
responding shortest paths through the multi-dimensional lattice in order to ﬁnd a solution to the
optimal auction problem.10 The general discrete approach naturally leads to the revenue equiv-
alence result, since participants’ payments are given by shortest paths lengths, hence the seller’s
expected revenue in any incentive compatible mechanism is uniquely given by the allocation sched-
ule. Notice that the revenue equivalence result is not obvious in the multi-dimensional continuous
case.
9Notice that the IC constraints bind along the shortest path, which can be interpreted as having the shortest path
at each vertex follows the direction of the IC constraint that binds at that vertex.
10It is interesting to note similarities of the most general approach to incentive compatible allocation rules in the
discrete and continuous multidimensional cases. Both our analysis in the discrete case, and Rochet (1987) in the
continuous case characterize incentive compatible allocation rules through the absence of a negative cycle in the
network.
22Solving for an optimal mechanism in a multi-dimensional environment is a hard problem in
either the discrete or continuous case. Not surprisingly, many results in which there is an explicit
solution to a multi-dimensional optimal mechanism rely on some properties of the problem that can
either reduce it to a one-dimensional case (Wilson (1993)), or help with reducing the set of available
options in (Maskin (2002)). In Sections 5 and 6 we examine speciﬁc cases when it is possible to
reduce available options, and simplify the multi-dimensional analysis in the discrete framework.
4.2 Discrete Approach
The problem of ﬁnding an optimal auction when types are multi-dimensional is considered to be
hard problem in the sense that no ‘closed form’ solution of the types found in the one-dimensional
case are possible. In this section we highlight the main diﬃculty is in extending previous results to
the multi-dimensional case. It turns out that the diﬃculties present themselves in two dimensions.
We concentrate on that case.
Denote a bidders type as (i,j), where i ∈ {1,...,I},a n dj ∈ {1,...,J} without the loss of
generality. Let fij be the probability that an agent has type (i,j). These bidders may obtain various
quantities of a homogeneous good. Each agent has a utility v(q|i,j) from getting q units of the
good. Also assume that v(q|i,j)s a t i s ﬁes increasing diﬀerences. That is, if q0 ≥ q and (i0,j0) ≥ (i,j)
then
v(q0|i0,j0) − v(q|i0,j0) ≥ v(q0|i,j) − v(q|i,j).
Denote by Aij the expected amount assigned to an agent who reports (i,j). Then the following
is true:
Theorem 6 Any incentive compatible allocation rule must be monotonic. That is for all (i,j) ≥
(i0,j0) we have Aij ≥ Ai0j0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1. First show monotonicity for (i,j)v s . ( i,j0)t h e nf o r
(i,j0)v s .( i0,j0).













































1. Horizontal Upward IC (HUIC)
Type (i,j)r e p o r t i n g( i0,j)w h e r ei0 >i :
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai0,j|i,j) − Pi0,j.
2. Horizontal Downward IC (HDIC)
Type (i,j)r e p o r t i n g( i0,j)w h e r ei0 <i:
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai0,j|i,j) − Pi0,j.
3. Vertical Upward IC (VUIC)
Type (i,j)r e p o r t i n g( i,j0)w h e r ej0 >j :
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai,j0|i,j) − Pi,j0.
4. Vertical Downward IC (VDIC)
Type (i,j)r e p o r t i n g( i,j0)w h e r ei0 <i :
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai,j0|i,j) − Pi,j0.
5. Diagonal Upward IC (DDIC)
Type (i,j)r e p o r t i n g( i0,j0)w h e r ei0 >iand j0 <j :
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai0,j0|i,j) − Pi0,j0.
6. Diagonal Downward IC (DUIC)
Type (i,j)r e p o r t i n g( i0,j0)w h e r ei0 <iand j0 >j :
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai0,j0|i,j) − Pi0,j0.
24The new wrinkle that multi-dimensionality adds are the diagonal IC constraints. The reader
will notice the omission of diagonal IC constraints relating type (i,j)w i t ht y p e( i0,j0) ≥ (i,j). This
is because they are implied by a combination of the horizontal and vertical IC constraints. This is
shown below. Consider the following diagonal IC constraints
v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− Pi+1,j+1 ≥ v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j+1 )− Pi,j. (15)
To see that the above ‘diagonal’ downward IC constraint is implied by the horizontal and vertical
adjacent downward IC constraints consider:
v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− Pi+1,j+1 ≥ v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− Pi,j+1
and
v(Ai,j+1|i,j +1 )− Pi,j+1 ≥ v(Ai,j|i,j +1 )− Pi,j.
Adding these two inequalities together yields:
v(Ai+1,j+1|i+1,j+1)−Pi+1,j+1 +v(Ai,j+1|i,j +1)≥ v(Ai,j+1|i+1,j+1)+v(Ai,j|i,j +1)−Pi,j.
Rearranging:
v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j+1 )− [Pi+1,j+1 − Pi,j] ≥
≥ [v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j+1 ) ]− [v(Ai,j+1|i,j +1 )− v(Ai,j|i,j +1 ) ].
The increasing diﬀerences property and the monotonicity of the allocation imply that
[v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j+1 ) ]− [v(Ai,j+1|i,j +1 )− v(Ai,j|i,j +1 ) ]≥ 0,
and hence we have that
v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j+1 )≥ Pi+1,j+1 − Pi,j
which is equivalent to (15), and thus proves the the adjacent diagonal downward constraint follows
the horizontal and vertical adjacent in 1D downward constraints. The rest, i.e. all possible non-
adjacent downward constraints, follow from a simple induction. Notice that the argument did not
rely on a speciﬁc functional form of v.
A similar argument applies to the diagonal IC constraint:
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai+1,j+1|i,j) − Pi+1,j+1. (16)
25The above diagonal IC constraint is implied by the following horizontal and vertical adjacent upward
IC constraints:
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − Pi+1,j ≥ v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j) − Pi+1,j+1
and
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pij ≥ v(Ai+1,j|i,j) − Pi+1,j.
Adding these two inequalities together yields:
v(Ai,j|i,j) − v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j)+v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai+1,j|i,j) ≥ Pij − Pi+1,j+1.
Rearranging:
v(Ai,j|i,j) − v(Ai+1,j+1|i,j) − [Pij − Pi+1,j+1] ≥
≥ [v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j)] − [v(Ai+1,j+1|i,j) − v(Ai+1,j|i,j)].
The increasing diﬀerences property and the monotonicity of the allocation imply that
[v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j)] − [v(Ai+1,j+1|i,j) − v(Ai+1,j|i,j)] ≥ 0,
and hence we have that
v(Ai,j|i,j) − v(Ai+1,j+1|i,j) ≥ Pij − Pi+1,j+1
which is equivalent to (16).
As in the one-dimensional case we have:
Theorem 7 Only the adjacent downward constraints w.r.t. (i +1 ,j) and (i,j) and w.r.t (i,j +1)
and (i,j) matter out of all horizontal and vertical downward constraints. Only the adjacent upward
constraints w.r.t. (i,j) and (i +1 ,j), w.r.t. (i,j) and (i,j +1 )matter out of all horizontal and
vertical upward constraints.
The theorem does not hold for the DDIC and DUIC constraints.
Theorem 8 If an adjacent HDIC or VDIC constraint binds, the corresponding adjacent upward
IC constraint is redundant.
Proof. Given that the corresponding downward adjacent IC constraint binds, i.e. then upward IC
constraints are redundant. Indeed, if
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j)=Pi+1,j − Pi,j,
26then by increasing diﬀerences and monotonicity of the allocation rule:
v(Ai+1,j|i,j) − v(Ai,j|i,j) ≤ Pi+1,j − Pi,j,
which is the corresponding upward constraint v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pi,j ≥ v(Ai+1,j|i,j) − Pi+1,j.S o t h e
corresponding adjacent upward IC constraint is redundant. The argument is exactly the same in
w.r.t. the j dimension.
Notice that when an adjacent HDIC constraint does not bind, the corresponding adjacent HUIC
constraint is not automatically satisﬁed, and may have a bite. Also notice that some of the adjacent
downward IC constraints would be slack since not all edges would likely to be used in optimal (i.e
shortest) paths to all vertices.
4.3 Non-redundancy of Diagonal IC’s
The diﬃculty that multi-dimensional types introduces is in the diagonal IC’s. Their presence makes
it diﬃcult to pin down the path in the underlying network that determines Pij for each (i,j). One
might hope that they are redundant. They are not. This can be seen by examining the adjacent
DUIC constraint:
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − Pi+1,j ≥ v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j) − Pi,j+1.
It can be rewritten as
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j) ≥ Pi+1,j − Pi,j+1.
Perhaps it can be replicated by following the path (i+1,j) → (i,j) → (i,j +1), i.e. by adding the
following:
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − Pi+1,j ≥ v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j) − Pi,j,
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pij ≥ v(Ai,j+1|i,j) − Pi,j+1.
This yields:
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j)+v(Ai,j|i,j) − v(Ai,j+1|i,j) ≥ Pi+1,j − Pi,j+1.
Rearranging:
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j) − [Pi+1,j − Pi,j+1] ≥
≥ [v(Ai,j+1|i,j) − v(Ai,j|i,j)] − [v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j)].
27>From monotonicity and increasing diﬀerences applied to the last term:
[v(Ai,j+1|i,j) − v(Ai,j|i,j)] − [v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j|i +1 ,j)] ≤ 0. (17)
If we could show that the left hand side of (17) was identically equal to 0, then the DUIC constraint
would be redundant.
Another attempt could made by following the path (i +1 ,j) → (i +1 ,j+1 )→ (i,j +1 ) ,i . e .
by adding the following:
v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − Pi+1,j ≥ v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j) − Pi+1,j+1,




v(Ai+1,j|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j) − [Pi+1,j − Pi,j+1] ≥
≥ [v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j)] − [v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 ) ].
Again, by monotonicity and increasing diﬀerences
[v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j) − v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j)] − [v(Ai+1,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 )− v(Ai,j+1|i +1 ,j+1 ) ]≤ 0.
(18)
If we could show that the left hand side of (18) was identically equal to 0, then the DUIC constraint
would be redundant.
A similar analysis holds for the DDIC constraints.
5 Capacitated Bidders
We now examine the problem of ﬁnding the revenue maximizing auction when bidders have con-
stant marginal valuations as well as capacity constraints. Both the marginal values and capacity
constraints are private information to the bidders.
A bidders type consists of two numbers a and b.T h e ﬁrst is the maximum amount they are
willing to pay for each unit. The second, b, called her capacity, is the largest number of units she
28seeks. Units beyond the bth are worthless. If such an agent is assigned q units, she derives a utility
of a(q,b)−. The seller has Q units to sell.
Let the range of a be R = {1,2,...,r} and the range of b be K = {1,...,k}.L e t fij be the
probability that an agent has type (i,j). The value that an agent of type (i,j)a s s i g n st oq units
will be written v(q|i,j)=i(q,j)−.O b s e r v et h a tv(q|i,j)s a t i s ﬁes increasing diﬀerences. That is, if
q0 ≥ q and (i0,j0) ≥ (i,j)t h e n
v(q0|i0,j0) − v(q|i0,j0) ≥ v(q0|i,j) − v(q|i,j).
Without loss of generality we can assume that the amount assigned to an agent who reports
type (i,j)w i l lb ea tm o s tj.I fAij is the expected amount assigned to an agent who reports (i,j)
then because this agent receives at most j in any allocation, her expected payoﬀ is iAij.
The crucial assumption we make is that no bidder can inﬂate his capacity but can shade it
down. In other words the auctioneer can verify, partially, the claims made by a bidder. This raises
two questions. The ﬁrst, is this plausible? Second, does it make the problem trivial.
In the selling context, which is what we have assumed, the assumption is odd. However, in a
procurement setting it may not be. Consider a procurement auction where the auctioneer wishes
to procure Q units from bidders with constant marginal costs and limited capacity. Both the
marginal cost and capacity is the private information of the bidder. However, no bidder will inﬂate
her capacity when bidding because of the huge penalties associated with not being able to fulﬁll
the order. Equivalently, we may suppose that that the designer can verify that claims that exceed
capacity are false.
Does limiting bidders to underreporting their capacities make the problem trivial? No. Con-
sider the standard uniform price auction. This popular auction form is vulnerable to bidders
underreporting their capacities. So, it is by no means obvious how to design an auction to cure
this.
Let Aij denote the expected allocation that an agent who reports type (i,j) will receive in some
direct mechanism and Pij her expected payment.
5.1 The No-Inﬂation Assumption
In the discrete case, solving the optimal auction problem in 2-D requires ﬁnding binding IC con-
straints and identifying shortest paths through a two-dimensional lattice for all possible set of al-
locations. Potentially we may have to enumerate all possible collections of binding IC constraints.
29Below we show that the no-inﬂation assumption allows us to simplify the analysis by removing
some of the diagonal IC constraints, thus making the 2-D problem solvable by allowing us to pin
down shortest paths through the 2-D lattice.
Recall that we can ignore diagonal IC constraints of the form:
v(Akk|k,k) − Pkk ≥ v(Ajj|k,k) − Pjj.
We now invoke the assumption that no bidder is permitted to inﬂate their capacity. With this
assumption we can ignore IC constraints of the form:
v(Aij|i,j) − Pij ≥ v(Ai0,j0|i,j) − Pi0,j0
where j0 >j .
To see why consider the following IC constraint:
v(Ai,j+k|i,j + k) − Pi,j+k ≥ v(Ai+r,j|i,j + k) − Pi+r,j.
When we substitute in our expression for v we obtain:
iAi,j+k − Pi,j+k ≥ iAi+r,j − Pi+r,j. (19)
We show that it is implied by the addition of the following vertical and horizontal IC constraints:
v(Ai,j+k|i,j + k) − Pi,j+k ≥ v(Ai,j|i,j + k) − Pij, (20)
v(Ai,j|i,j) − Pij ≥ v(Ai+r,j|i,j) − Pi+r,j. (21)
Adding (20) and (21) yields:
v(Ai,j+k|i,j + k) − Pi,j+k + v(Ai,j|i,j) ≥ v(Ai,j|i,j + k)+v(Ai+r,j|i,j) − Pi+r,j. (22)
Substitute in our expression for v:
iAi,j+k − Pi,j+k + iAi,j ≥ iAi,j + iAi+r,j − Pi+r,j.
Cancelling common terms yields (19). There is no similar argument for eliminating a diagonal IC
associated with bidders allowed to exaggerate their capacities. This is because in the inequalities
we manipulate have a term of the form v(Aij|i,j − k). Since Aij could exceed j − k it is not true
that v(Aij|i,j − k)=iAij. Summarizing, the only IC constraints that matter are the adjacent
HUIC, HDIC and DDIC.
305.2 A Formulation
Let t denote an n agent proﬁle of types and tn−1 an n − 1 agent proﬁle of types. Denote by aij[t]
the actual allocation that a type (i,j) will receive under allocation rule A when the announced
proﬁle is t. In the case when type (i,j) does not appear in the proﬁle t we take aij[t]=0 . We will
have cause to study how the allocation for an agent with a given type, (i,j) say, will change when
the types of the other n − 1 agents change. In these cases we will write aij(t)a n daij[(i,j),t n−1].
Then Aij =
P
tn−1 π(tn−1)aij(tn−1)w h e r eπ(tn−1) is the probability of proﬁle tn−1 being realized
and the sum is over all possible proﬁles. Let nij(t) denote the fraction of bidders in the proﬁle t
with type (i,j).
We can now formulate the problem of ﬁnding the revenue maximizing allocation as a linear
program in the following way. We drop all diagonal IC constraints as well as all the upward vertical
and horizontal IC constraints. The HUIC constraints are the only ones we have not shown to
redundant. However, Theorem 8 ensures that HUIC will be satisﬁed. The problem we study is
[OPT3] is:







s.t. v(Aij|i,j) − Pij ≥ v(Ai−1,j|i,j) − Pi−1,j
v(Aij|i,j) − Pij ≥ v(Ai,j−1|i,j) − Pi,j−1









nnij(t)aij[t] ≤ Q ∀t
aij[t] ≤ j ∀i,j ∀t
Now we describe a network representation of this linear program. Fix the Aij’s. For each type
(i,j) introduce a vertex including the dummy type (0,0). For each pair (i,j),(i+1,j) introduce a
directed edge from (i,j)t o( i+1,j)w i t hl e n g t hv(Ai+1,j|i+1,j)−v(Aij|i+1,j)=( i+1)Ai+1,j −
(i +1 ) Aij. Similarly a directed edge from (i,j)t o( i,j +1 )o fl e n g t hiAi,j+1 − iAij.T h e nPij will
be the length of the shortest path from the dummy type (0,0) to (i,j). We show that the shortest
path from (1,1) to (i,j)i s( 1 ,1) → (1,2) → (1,3)...→ (1,j) → (2,j)...→ (i,j).
31Theorem 9
Pij = v(Aij|i,j) −
i−1 X
r=1
[v(Arj|r +1 ,j) − v(Arj|r,j)] =
i X
r=1
r(Arj − Ar−1,j) − A11 + P11.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the shortest path from (1,1) to (i,j) is straight up and across. The
proof is by induction. It is clearly true for vertices (1,2) and (2,1). Consider the vertex (2,2). The
length of (1,1) → (2,1) → (2,2) is
2A22 − 2A21 +2 A21 − 2A11 + P11 =2 A22 − 2A11 + P11.
The length of the path (1,1) → (1,2) → (2,2) is
2A22 − 2A1,2 + A1,2 − A11 + P11 =2 A22 − A12 − A11 + P11.
The diﬀerence in length between the ﬁrst and the second path is
(2A22 − 2A11) − (2A22 − A12 − A11)=A12 − A11 ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows by monotonicity of the A’s.
Now suppose the claim is true for all vertices (i,j)w h e r ei,j ≤ n − 1. The shortest path from
(1,1) to (1,n) is clearly up the top. A similar argument to the previous one shows that the shortest
path from (1,1) to (2,n) is also up the top and across. Consider now vertex (3,n). There are two
candidates for a shortest path from (1,1) to (3,n). One is (1,1) → (1,n−1) → (3,n−1) → (3,n).
This path has length
3A3n−3A3,n−1+3A3,n−1−3A2,n−1+2A2,n−1−2A1,n−1+P1,n−1 =3 A3n−A2,n−1−2A1,n−1+P1,n−1.
The other path, (1,1) → (1,n) → (3,n)h a sl e n g t h
3A3n − 3A2n +2 A2n − 2A1,n + A1,n − A1,n−1 + P1,n−1 =3 A3n − A2n − A1,n − A1,n−1 + P1,n−1.
The diﬀerence in length between the ﬁrst and second path is
A2n + A1n + A1,n−1 − A2,n−1 − 2A1,n−1 = A2n + A1n − A2,n−1 − A1,n−1 ≥ 0.
Again the last inequality follows by monotonicity of the a’s.
Proceeding inductively in this way we can establish the claim for vertices of the form (i,n)
where i ≤ n−1a n df o r( n,j)w h e r ej ≤ n−1. It remains then to prove the claim for vertex (n,n).
One path is (1,n− 1) → (n,n − 1) → (n,n) and has length
nAnn − nAn,n−1 + nAn,n−1 − nAn−1,n−1 +( n − 1)An−1,n−1 − (n − 1)An−2,n−1 + ...+ P1,n−1
32= nAnn − An−1,n−1 − An−2,n−1 − ...+ P1,n−1.
The length of the other path, (1,1) → (1,n) → (n,n)i s
nAnn − nAn−1,n +( n − 1)An−1,n − (n − 1)An−2,n + ...+ A1n − A1,n−1 + P1,n−1.
Again, by the monotonicity of the A’s the second path is shorter than the ﬁrst.
Let Fj(r)=
Pr
t=1 ftj.T h e nf o re a c hj we have
n X
i=1








[v(Aij|i,j) − v(Aij|i +1 ,j)].
Following Myerson, we can think of this as the virtual valuation conditional on wanting to consume








Our optimization problem becomes:





















nnij(t)aij[t] ≤ Q ∀t
aij[t] ≤ j ∀i,j ∀t
Substituting out the Aij variables yields:


























nnij(t)aij[(i,j),t n−1] ≤ Q ∀t
aij[t] ≤ j ∀i,j ∀t
33If we ignore the monotonicity condition
P
tn−1 Pr(tn−1)aij[(i,j),t n−1] ≥
P
tn−1 Pr(tn−1)ai0j0[(i0,j0),t n−1],



















aij[t] ≤ j ∀i,j
This is an instance of a continuous knapsack problem with upper bound constraints on the variables
which is easy to solve. Basically, select the pair (i,j) which maximizes i −
1−Fj(i)
fij and increase aij
units it reaches its upper bound or the supply is exhausted, whichever comes ﬁrst. If the supply is
not exhausted repeat.







∀ (i,j) ≥ (i0,j0).
The resulting solution would satisfy the omitted monotonicity constraint.
6 Wilson’s Case
O n ec a s ew h e r ei ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd the optimal paths is in a discrete 2D analog of a continuous
model ﬁrst solved by Wilson (1993, Chapter 13). In Wilson’s model customers are uniformly
distributed on Ω = {t ∈ R2
+,t 1 + t2 ≤ 1}, with utility v(q|t)=q · t, and the seller has the cost
C(q)=
kqk2





P(t) − C(q(t))dt (OPT-W)
s.t. v(q(t)|t) − P(t) ≤ v(q(s)|t) − P(s) ∀t,s ∈ Ω (IC)












346.1 Discrete Approach to the Problem
Let’s solve the [OPT-W] problem in discrete polar coordinates using the network representation.
Consider a discrete grid in polar coordinates (r,ϕ), i.e.
t1 = rcosϕ,
t2 = rsinϕ.
where r ∈ {r1,...,r n},w h e r eri = i
n and ϕ ∈ {0, π
2k, 2π
2k,...,π
2}. Consider the direct mechanism
approach with the allocation schedule given by
q1(r,ϕ)=R(r, ϕ)cosθ(r,ϕ),
q2(r,ϕ)=R(r, ϕ)sinθ(r,ϕ).
The IC constraints then are
R(r,ϕ)cosθ(r,ϕ)rcosϕ + R(r,ϕ)sinθ(r,ϕ)rsinϕ − P(r,ϕ) ≥
≥ R(r0,ϕ 0)cosθ(r0,ϕ 0)rcosϕ + R(r0,ϕ 0)sinθ(r0,ϕ 0)rsinϕ − P(r0,ϕ 0).





Our approach will be to conjecture that the optimal paths must be radial and then compute an
optimal allocation for such a conjecture. This amounts to relaxing some of the IC constraints. We
complete the argument by showing that the solution found satisﬁes the IC constraints that were
relaxed.
Lemma 3 If a payment P(ri,ϕ) is determined by a radial path (0,ϕ) −→ (r1,ϕ) −→ ... −→ (ri,ϕ),
then then optimal allocations are given by
q1(ri,ϕ)=R(ri,ϕ)cosϕ,
q2(ri,ϕ)=R(ri,ϕ)sinϕ,




[rjR(rj,ϕ) − rjR(rj−1,ϕ)]. (24)
35Proof. The proof is done by induction in ri ∈ {r1,...,r n+1}.




If the payment is set through a radial path, i.e. (0,ϕ j) −→ (r1,ϕ j), then









and the proﬁti s












Notice that the above proﬁt along the path is maximized in θ when θ(r,ϕj)=ϕj (indeed, it does
not aﬀect the cost, while maximizing the revenue), hence
q1(r1,ϕ j)=R(r1,ϕ j)cosϕj,
q2(r1,ϕ j)=R(r1,ϕ j)sinϕj,













and that P(ri+1,ϕ j) is determined by the path (0,ϕ j) −→ ... −→ (ri,ϕ j) −→ (ri+1,ϕ j), we
conclude










and the proﬁta l o n gt h ep a t hi s






















B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si nt h ec a s eo fr1, we conclude that the above proﬁt is maximized when








Lemma 4 If all proﬁt-maximizing payments P(ri,ϕ) are determined by radial paths
(0,ϕ) −→ (r1,ϕ) −→ ... −→ (ri,ϕ), then optimal allocations are given by
q1(ri,ϕ)=R(ri)cosϕ, (25)
q2(ri,ϕ)=R(ri)sinϕ, (26)




[rjR(rj) − rjR(rj−1)]. (27)
Proof. The proof is done by induction in ri ∈ {r1,...,r n+1}.















































The assumption that P(ri+1,ϕ) is determined by the path (0,ϕ) −→ ... −→ (ri,ϕ) −→ (ri+1,ϕ),
along with Lemma 3 give
q1(ri+1,ϕ)=R(ri+1,ϕ)cosϕ,
q2(ri+1,ϕ)=R(ri+1,ϕ)sinϕ,
P(ri+1,ϕ i)=ri+1R(ri+1,ϕ i) − ri+1R(ri)+P(ri),











































Lemma 5 All proﬁt-maximizing payments P(ri,ϕ) are determined by radial paths
(0,ϕ) −→ (r1,ϕ) −→ ... −→ (ri,ϕ).
Proof. The proof is done by induction in rn.
First, consider the case of i =1 ,a n dϕ ∈ {0, π
2k, 2π
2k,...,π
2}. Denote payments that are determined
by radial paths (0,ϕ) −→ (r1,ϕ)a sPr(r1,ϕ), and .payments that are determined by nonradial paths
(0,ϕ 0) −→ (r1,ϕ 0) −→ (r1,ϕ)a sPnr(r1,ϕ). Then
Pr(r1,ϕ)=R(r1,ϕ)cosθ(r1,ϕ)(r1 cosϕ)+R(r1,ϕ)sinθ(r1,ϕ)(r1 sinϕ), (29)
and
Pnr(r1,ϕ)=R(r1,ϕ)cosθ(r1,ϕ)(r1 cosϕ)+R(r1,ϕ)sinθ(r1,ϕ)(r1 sinϕ)−
−R(r1,ϕ 0)cosθ(r1,ϕ 0)(r1 cosϕ) − R(r1,ϕ 0)sinθ(r1,ϕ 0)(r1 sinϕ)+Pr(r1,ϕ 0).
Lemma 3 gives that Pr(r1,ϕ 0)=r1R(r1,ϕ 0), hence
Pnr(r1,ϕ)=R(r1,ϕ)cosθ(r1,ϕ)(r1 cosϕ)+R(r1,ϕ)sinθ(r1,ϕ)(r1 sinϕ)−
−R(r1,ϕ 0)cosθ(r1,ϕ 0)(r1 cosϕ) − R(r1,ϕ 0)sinθ(r1,ϕ 0)(r1 sinϕ)+r1R(r1,ϕ 0). (30)
Combining (29) and (30) we obtain
Pnr(r1,ϕ)=Pr(r1,ϕ)+r1R(r1,ϕ 0)
¡
1 − cosθ(r1,ϕ 0)cosϕ − sinθ(r1,ϕ 0)sinϕ
¢
.
Finally, since cosθcosϕ +s i nθsinϕ<1f o r∀θ 6= ϕ, we conclude that
Pnr(r1,ϕ) ≥ Pr(r1,ϕ),
which proves that the radial path is the shorter one, and since payments are determined by shortest
paths, proﬁt-maximizing payments P(r1,ϕ) are determined by radial paths.
39Now let’s do the transition from i to i + 1. Assuming that P(ri,ϕ) are determined by radial






[rjR(rj) − rjR(rj−1)]. (33)
We now need to show that the payment Pr(ri+1,ϕ), determined by the radial path (ri,ϕ) −→
(ri+1,ϕ) is smaller than paymentsPnr1(ri+1,ϕ)a n dPnr2(ri+1,ϕ), that are determined by paths
(ri,ϕ 0) −→ (ri+1,ϕ 0) −→ (ri+1,ϕ)a n d( ri,ϕ 0) −→ (ri+1,ϕ) respectively. Then using (31), (32),
and (33), and without assuming anything about allocations at (ri+1,ϕ), we get
Pr(ri+1,ϕ)=R(ri+1,ϕ)cosθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 cosϕ)+R(ri+1,ϕ)sinθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 sinϕ)
−ri+1R(ri)+Pr(ri). (34)
For the Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ)w eh a v e
Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ)=R(ri+1,ϕ)cosθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 cosϕ)+R(ri+1,ϕ)sinθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 sinϕ)−
−R(ri+1,ϕ 0)cosθ(ri+1,ϕ 0)(ri+1 cosϕ) − R(ri+1,ϕ 0)sinθ(ri+1,ϕ 0)(ri+1 sinϕ)+Pr(ri+1,ϕ 0). (35)
Now notice that for the Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ) to be determined by the shortest path, Pr(ri+1,ϕ 0)m u s tb e
determined by the radial path, hence by Lemma 3
Pr(ri+1,ϕ 0)=ri+1R(ri+1,ϕ 0) − ri+1R(ri)+Pr(ri). (36)
Combining (35) and (36) we obtain
Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ)=R(ri+1,ϕ)cosθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 cosϕ)+R(ri+1,ϕ)sinθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 sinϕ)−
−R(ri+1,ϕ 0)cosθ(ri+1,ϕ 0)(ri+1 cosϕ) − R(ri+1,ϕ 0)sinθ(ri+1,ϕ 0)(ri+1 sinϕ)+ (37)
+ri+1R(ri+1,ϕ 0) − ri+1R(ri)+Pr(ri).
Finally, (34) and (37) give
Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ)=Pr(ri+1,ϕ)+ri+1R(ri+1,ϕ 0)
¡
1 − cosθ(ri+1,ϕ 0)cosϕ − sinθ(ri+1,ϕ 0)sinϕ
¢
,
40and since cosθcosϕ +s i nθsinϕ<1f o r∀θ 6= ϕ, we conclude that
Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ) ≥ Pr(ri+1,ϕ). (38)
For the Pnr2(ri+1,ϕ)w eh a v e
Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ)=R(ri+1,ϕ)cosθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 cosϕ)+R(ri+1,ϕ)sinθ(ri+1,ϕ)(ri+1 sinϕ)−
−R(ri,ϕ 0)cosθ(ri,ϕ 0)(ri+1 cosϕ) − R(ri,ϕ 0)sinθ(ri,ϕ 0)(ri+1 sinϕ)+Pr(ri,ϕ 0). (39)




Finally, (34) and (40) give
Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ)=Pnr1(ri+1,ϕ). (41)
This inequality (38) and equality (40) prove that the radial path is the shortest one, and since pay-
ments are determined by shortest paths, all proﬁt-maximizing payments P(ri+1,ϕ) are determined
by radial paths.
Theorem 10 Optimal allocations are given by
q1(ri,ϕ)=R(ri)cosϕ,
q2(ri,ϕ)=R(ri)sinϕ,





Proof. Follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Theorem 10 allows us to successfully solve Wilson’s optimization problem in polar coordinates.
The uniform probability density function changes from f(t1,t 2)= 4
π to f(r,ϕ)=2 r in continu-
ous case, and to f(i)= 2i
n(n+1) and F(i)=
i(i+1)
n(n+1) in discrete case after the switch to the polar
coordinates.
41The problem [OPT-W] is now reduced to a standard one-dimensional proﬁt maximization prob-
lem, which can be successfully solve by following Myerson’s (1981) approach in a discrete case.




[v(Ai|i +1 )− v(Ai|i)],

























Hence the proﬁt maximizing problem could be written as





































































The expression (42) is the exact discrete analog of Wilson’s continuous solution to [OPT-W]
given by (23).
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we study auctions in a multi-dimensional type space with discrete types. This has
the advantage of transparency of analysis, and it also allows one to approach the problem from an
intuitive graph theoretic perspective. This approach highlights the connections between optimal
42mechanism design and the problem of ﬁnding a shortest path in a lattice, as well as linear program-
ming. It clariﬁes the nature of the diﬃculties inherent in the multi-dimensional optimal auction
design, and makes clear which cases are solvable and which are not.
We oﬀer a graph theoretic perspective on existing results, such as Myerson’s (1981) one-
dimensional optimal auction design problem along with the ironing procedure, and Wilson’s (1993)
problem for a monopolist to design optimal quantity/allocation schedules for two-dimensional con-
sumer types. Our approach also provides new results for two-dimensional auctions with capacitated
bidders under the no-inﬂation assumption.
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